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ARTICLES
THE CHANGING STANDARDS BY WHICH
DIRECTORS WILL BE JUDGED
HARVEY L. PITTtt
Being an effective director is a learned, not innate, skill.
Nor is it a static proposition. Standards for directors change
over time, especially as we deliberate more about what directors
should do and as we learn what happens when there are
important things they don't do.
Corporate directors of public companies represent a
company's shareholders.1 Without honest, wise, and experienced
directors, public investors wouldn't trust their funds to corporate
managers. As shareholder representatives, directors are
responsible for ensuring that their company governs its affairs to
maximize shareholder value. 2 Directors do not, and should not,
manage the company; that authority is delegated to
management. 3 Rather, directors oversee management or direct,
t The text of this article is taken from remarks made by Mr. Pitt to the
administration, faculty, alumni, and students at St. John's University School of Law
on February 2, 2005.
it J.D., Hon. L.L.D., St. John's University School of Law; B.A., Brooklyn
College. Prior to founding Kalorama Partners LLC, Mr. Pitt was the twenty-sixth
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, from 2001 until 2003, and a
partner in Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP for nearly twenty-five
years.
1 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d. 858, 872 (Del. 1985). In the rush by some states to prevent hostile takeovers
of locally domiciled companies, state corporation laws were amended to require
directors to consider other constituency groups as well. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. §
717(b) (2005); PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (2005).
2 See, e.g., MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 97
(1995). The Supreme Court of Delaware has most clearly expressed this duty in the
context of corporate control transactions. See Paramount Communications v. QVC
Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986).
3 See Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 179.
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a word derived from the Latin word meaning to "guide" or "set
straight."4
For at least a century, the role of non-management
corporate directors was often treated as one of passivity, not
activism. 5 Power to manage a corporation's affairs was believed
to reside exclusively in the hands of its senior officers, with the
proper role of outside directors being generically and non-
intrusively to oversee, and approve (when asked to do so),
significant managerial decisions. 6 This misperception of an
outside director's proper role was fostered by several factors:
" Selecting outside directors was seen as a CEO perk;
" Good corporate officers were perceived as focused and
effective, and also absolute monarchs;
" Outside directors lacked effective resources to obtain
their own guidance and assistance;
* No clear consensus existed on how outside directors
should perform their roles; and
* Many corporate advisors were fixated with elevating
form over substance.7
Corporate scandals bred in the '90s exposed this weak
leadership, which at times had permitted practices that were
clearly illegal to occur and thrive nonetheless. The passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("S-Ox") in July, 20028 reemphasized the
role of directors as elected representatives of the shareholders
and the stewards of company assets.
It is axiomatic that directors must act in good faith, in the
best interests of the corporation, and with appropriate diligence
and care. 9  While S-Ox did not formally change the
responsibilities of directors, it has federalized those
responsibilities and given regulators and prosecutors new
4 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005); Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 179; 4
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 701 (2d ed. 1991).
5 See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)("[Aibsent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon... directors to install and
operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out-wrongdoing which they have
no reason to suspect exists.").
6 See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 52-53 (1986).
7 See Robert M. Estes, The Case for Counsel to Outside Directors, HARv. Bus.
REV., July-Aug. 1976, at 125-32.
8 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
9 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d. 858 (Del. 1985).
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weapons in enforcing them. 10  S-Ox also has placed added
emphasis on policies, procedures and methodologies by which
directors fulfill their responsibilities.11 The performance of these
functions now assumes even more critical importance to the
success and well-being of corporate America.
Along with these changes, the liability landscape for
corporate directors has been changing dramatically. Most
recently, three events are causing greater focus by directors on
the thorny issue of personal liability: (1) The Emerging
Communications case, decided by the Delaware Chancery Court
last June; 12 (2) the Disney shareholders' suit over former
President Michael Ovitz's $140 million severance package; 13 and
(3) the recent proposed settlements, by outside directors, of
WorldCom' 4 and Enron' 5 class action litigation last month. The
outcomes of these three phenomena suggest the need for outside
directors to adopt a proactive stance in performing their
oversight functions.
Traditionally, corporations shield individuals from personal
liability except in egregious circumstances.16  This is why
corporations are separate legal entities.' 7  As a separate
"person," the corporation is generally responsible for the firm's
actions. This is so because corporations are expected to take
appropriate business risks.' If personal liability extended to
10 See Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on
the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 671
(2002).
11 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2005).
12 In re Emerging Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 70, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004).
13 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, No. 15452 (Del. Ch. letter
opinion Feb. 4, 2005).
14 News Release, Office of the New York State Comptroller, Hevesi Announces
Historic Settlement, Former WorldCom Directors to Pay from Own Pockets, (Jan. 7,
2005), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/jan5/01O705.html.
15 News Release, Office of the President of the University of California, UC
Reaches $168 Million Settlement with Enron Directors in Securities Fraud Case,
(Jan. 7, 2005), available at http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/ 200 5/JanO7 .
html.
16 See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A
Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE J. ON REG. 387, 387-88 (1992) ("Under the
doctrine of limited liability, if a judgment is rendered against a corporation in an
amount that exceeds its ability to pay, judgment creditors cannot pursue the
corporation's shareholders to collect the residual amount.").
17 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89-90 (1985).
18 See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Easterbrook &
2005]
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managers and directors, they would take far fewer risks. That
would mean fewer corporations, fewer investments, and fewer
jobs. Managers and directors would not be inclined to pursue
transactions where the costs exceeded the benefits to themselves,
the wrong measure for any corporate decision. Therefore, from a
policy perspective, corporate law traditionally has embraced the
view that it is better to encourage directors and managers to
take risks, so corporations can create wealth and jobs.19 In the
end, the threat of personal liability might make directors and
managers excessively risk averse in their decision-making,
thereby injuring shareholders, chilling investment, and
diminishing efficiency.
I. THE EMERGING COMMUNICATIONS DECISION
The Emerging Communications20 decision by the Delaware
Chancery Court involved the privatization of a telephone
company in the U.S. Virgin Islands by the company's controlling
shareholder, Chairman and CEO. The Board of the company
formed a special committee to negotiate the two-step going-
private transaction on behalf of minority shareholders. The
Special Committee recommended the merger to the rest of the
board, which approved it at a price of $10.25 per share. The full
board approved the transaction, the Chairman abstaining due to
his conflicts of interest. After the privatization was completed,
shareholders brought an appraisal proceeding against the board.
The Chairman's conflicts of interest rendered the business
judgment rule inapplicable. Instead, the defendant directors had
to prove the transaction satisfied Delaware's "entire fairness"
test, which requires a showing of both a fair price and fair
dealing. 21
In deciding the case, the Delaware Chancery Court (per
Justice Jacobs, a former judge on the Court of Chancery and now
a Delaware Supreme Court Justice, who was sitting by
designation) exculpated the entire board of directors from
personal liability, except for the conflicted Chairman and one
other director, who had joined all his colleagues in approving the
transaction. The director, Salvatore Muoio, had been a
Fischel, supra note 17, at 93-103.
19 See, e.g., Joy, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86.
20 Emerging Communications, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *1.
21 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
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securities analyst and a portfolio manager in the
telecommunications sector, and thus was found to possess "a
specialized financial expertise" that was "equivalent, if not
superior," to the expertise of the Special Board Committee's
outside financial experts. 22 This specialized expertise, in turn,
made this director liable when his colleagues were not, because
he had, in the Court's view, "far less reason [than the others] to
defer" to the outside expert's opinions and conclusions. 23 The
Court found that Muoio violated his duty of loyalty because he
"voted to approve the transaction even though he knew, or
should at the very least have had strong reason to believe, that
the $10.25 per share merger price was unfair."24 Muoio did not
serve on the Board's Special Committee and did not receive or
have access to any more information about the transaction than
other board members whom the Court exculpated.
One implication of this holding, especially given S-Ox's
requirement that public companies disclose whether or not their
audit committees contain at least one outside director with
financial expertise, 25 is that those with special expertise need to
take extra care if they wish their utilization of and reliance on
outside experts to exculpate them from liability in shareholder
litigation. Another significant implication is that those directors
who lack "specialized financial expertise" may be entitled to rely
upon the judgments and opinions of those who in fact do possess
specialized financial expertise. 26
II. THE DISNEY SHAREHOLDERS' SUIT OVER MICHAEL OVITZ'S PAY
PACKAGE
Testimony wrapped up last month in the shareholder suit
against Disney's former President, Michael Ovitz, and the
directors who approved the enormous pay package for the
Hollywood powerbroker who briefly and unsuccessfully took
charge of Disney in 1995.27 The Delaware Chancery Court likely
will issue a decision some time in the late spring. If the Court
22 Id. at *144, *145.
23 Id. at *145.
24 Id. at *143.
25 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2005).
26 Emerging Communications, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *144.
27 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, No. 15452 (Del. Ch. letter
opinion Feb. 4, 2005). See Evidence Phase of Disney Trial Concludes, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 20, 2005.
20051
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finds that Disney's independent directors failed to exercise their
business judgment and fulfill their fiduciary duties in good faith,
then the directors may be held personally liable for their decision
to approve Ovitz's pay package, which included a $140 million
severance package that was triggered and paid out.
Executive compensation, both during service and in parting
ways, is a lightning rod issue that is attracting all sorts of
attention from regulators, investors and the media, 28 and rightly
so. The chasm between Wall Street's perception of what
constitutes fair compensation and Main Street's contrary view is
enormous. Yet, CEO pay keeps rising-often at faster rates than
profits. 29
Executives should not be allowed to profit on false earnings
statements. Companies increasingly are trying to recoup
severance payments, salary, bonuses, option profits and other
payments to executives who bear responsibility for a company's
subpar performance or malfeasance. Last month, for example,
Nortel Networks restated its earnings and said twelve executives
would voluntarily return $8.6 million in bonuses awarded on the
prior numbers.30  And in December, Congressman Richard
Baker, Chairman of the House Financial Services Subcommittee
on Capital Markets, called for the return of all bonus payments
awarded to Fannie Mae executives based upon faulty earnings
statements.31
Executive compensation will remain a spotlight issue for the
foreseeable future.32 It is critical for boards of directors to revisit
their compensation policies and procedures. Compensation
28 See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation
Through A Partnership Lens: A Tool to Focus Reform, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 153,
153-54 (2000).
29 See, e.g., Louis Lavelle, Special Report: Executive Pay, Bus. WK. Apr. 19,
2004, at 106.
30 News Release, Nortel Networks, Nortel Networks Corporation Files 2003
Financial Statements, (Jan. 11, 2005), available at http://www.nortel.com/corporate/
news/newsreleases/2005a/0111_05_2003 financial_statements.html.
31 News Release, Congressman Richard Baker, In Letter to Baker, OFHEO
Vows, Spells Out Authority to Recapture Fannie Bonuses Based on Faulty
Financials, (Jan. 19, 2005), available at http://www.baker.house.gov/html/release.cf
m?id=l19.
32 See Alan L. Beller, Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance,
Remarks to the National Association of Stock Plan Professionals, the Corporate
Counsel, and the Corporate Executive, outlining the SEC's recent initiatives in the
area (Oct. 20, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchl020O4alb.
htm.
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should be structured to align management's interests with those
of shareholders. CEOs should be rewarded for producing growth
in fundamental company values, such as market share, markets
served, etc., and setting the right tone at the top, not for
achieving some measure of earnings per share. It's too easy for
companies to manipulate earnings per share, at least in the
short run.
III. THE WORLDCOM AND ENRON CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
In January, plaintiffs settling WorldCom and Enron class
action litigation demanded, and received, agreement that the
outside directors of both companies would put up a significant
amount of their own assets in settling those cases.33 In the
WorldCom litigation, ten directors attempted to reach a
settlement under which they would personally pay $18 million of
a $54 million settlement. Despite the existence of D&O
insurance coverage, individual WorldCom directors offered to put
up as much as twenty percent of their collective net worth to
settle an action where the directors did not know, but also did
not prevent, a securities fraud from occurring. The court
rejected the proposed settlement under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, and presumably, these directors will now
face a trial.3 4
In the current climate confronting any defendant in
securities litigation, there is clearly a risk that a jury (especially
one in the city where a now-defunct company played a major
economic role) will impose liability in draconian amounts. In
both the WorldCom and Enron cases, the directors made the
judgment that the risk of an adverse jury decision was far more
compelling than the burden of employing some personal assets to
purchase a settlement of the litigation.
33 See News Releases, supra notes 14 and 15.
34 It is not possible to predict how a jury will react to the case, but it is
interesting to speculate that, apart from the prospect that the defendants might be
exposed to a greater damage award, the jury could also award no (or lesser)
damages against the outside directors, in which case the plaintiff-who insisted
upon personal payments for political, not substantive, reasons-might face his own
liability exposure.
2005]
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IV. WHAT'S A DIRECTOR (OR WOULD-BE DIRECTOR) TO Do?
To some, these recent events confirm their pre-existing view
that board service for public companies is no longer feasible or
desirable. 35 That is, I suggest, an over-reaction. Equally off the
mark is the observation of others that there is (and will be) no
dearth of board candidates because directors will still enjoy
traveling to pleasant foreign locations for board meetings and
the clubhouse status of being a director.36 There are, rather,
prudent steps directors, and especially outside directors, should
consider before declining to serve on a public company board, or
deciding to resign from a public company board on which they
presently sit. These proactive steps can minimize considerably
the likelihood of liability, especially personal liability.
1. Due Diligence. The days when a mere invitation to
join a board was considered an honor not lightly to be
refused are long gone. Board service may not be "an
honor," but it is a serious undertaking. Prior to
accepting an invitation to join a board, candidates
need to do a thorough job of due diligence, examining
how the company operates, the working relationships
between management and the board, the assets
provided to the board, and the company's adherence
to good governance and full transparency.
Prospective board candidates should not rely solely
on their own due diligence, but should be given the
tools to have an independent evaluation made of the
company's transparency and governance.
2. Understand the Company. Corporations are complex
entities, and they often cover very wide swaths.
Directors need to understand the nature of the
company's business, its culture, its patterns, its
industry and the problems that face both the specific
35 See, e.g., Directors Are Getting The Jitters - Recent Settlements Tapping
Executives' Personal Assets Put Boardrooms on Edge, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at
Bi.
36 See id. ("[C]orporate board members already enjoy tremendous benefits
besides handsome compensation, suggests Melvyn Weiss, a senior partner at
Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP, a major class-action law firm. Citing
directors' opportunities to network extensively and travel to exotic places for board
meetings, he adds: 'It's a whole way of life. You think they're going to give that
up?').
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company as well as other companies in similar lines
of business.
3. Know the Management Team. Who are the corporate
managers? What are their strengths, their
weaknesses? What access does a director, or
prospective director, have to anyone working at, or
for, the company?
4. Know the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Other
Directors. Who are the other directors? What
expertise, if any, do they possess? How do they
approach their jobs? Being the most knowledgeable,
or the hardest working, director on a board is a
negative, not a positive. The best boards will balance
the talents of many individuals who bring unique
insights, expertise and perspectives to the
boardroom, upon whom the other directors can all
rely.
5. Ensure the Existence and Availability of a Team of
Outside Experts. S-Ox requires companies to make
resources available to directors to perform their
myriad responsibilities. In light of the Emerging
Communications decision, the directors should be
satisfied that their outside experts have far greater
financial and other expertise than the members of
the board. The outside directors should select their
own outside experts.
6. Have a Game Plan. The outside directors need to be
organized, with an active agenda for each fiscal year,
and with established experts on hand and on call to
assist the directors. How many times will the board
and critical committees-the Audit, Compensation,
Nominating, Legal Compliance and Disclosure
committees-meet? When will substantive issues
and risks be examined by the board and these
committees? Advance planning, and time for
thoughtful evaluation, are crucial.
7. Require Full Disclosure. An effective board is one in
which management and the outside directors work
collaboratively to achieve the company's desired
objectives. A critical element of such a working
relationship is full disclosure. While directors cannot
2005]
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immerse themselves in the intricacies of a company's
many-faceted operations, they can ensure that all
critical information is given to them on a timely
basis.
8. Assure the Integrity of the Decision-Making Process.
Board members need to understand, and be satisfied
with, the types of decisions they will be asked to
make, and those that will be entrusted to
management's discretion. Board packages that
either "dumb down" important issues, or create a "sea
of impenetrable documents," disserve the company,
its managers, and the directors. It is critical for
directors to make certain that they are given every
important detail regarding any proposed action.
9. Is There a Continuous Stream of Information
Flowing to the Board? In years past, some managers
had the tendency either to wait until there was no
alternative to bring the board "into the loop," or to
distrust the ability of the board to maintain
confidentiality of sensitive information. Board
members should have a continuous flow of relevant
and significant data. If management thinks some
directors may leak sensitive data, those directors
should be replaced. The solution can never be to
withhold information from the board.
10. Actively Play-Out Crisis Scenarios. Every day, the
business press reports another terrible disaster at an
otherwise fine company. Many of these can be
handled far more deftly than they actually are, but
the lack of crisis preparation impairs the ability of
companies to perform well in the face of a crisis.
11. Look for Problems Before They Find You. The
ancient wisdom of not looking for problems that
haven't surfaced is no longer possible or wise. Boards
need to understand what risks a company may
implicitly be accepting in the way it does business,
and need to be certain that there is a determined
effort to ascertain whether problems are lurking just
beneath the surface.
12. Regularly Evaluate the Company's Systems,
Procedures and Approaches. The Board needs to be
[Vol.79:1
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proactive in understanding what systems,
procedures, assumptions and approaches
management is employing to keep the company on
track.
13. Keep Accurate and Complete Records of All Board
Deliberations. As we often note, it's important not
only to do the right thing, but to be able to
demonstrate that you've done the right thing. This
places a premium on good recordkeeping.
14. Avoid Two-Dimensional Disclosure and Assessment
Efforts. One of the biggest mistakes a company can
make is to ignore comparative approaches at
similarly situated companies. Particularly in
disclosure contexts, it's essential that the company's
proposed disclosures are compared with its core
group of peer companies.
15. Consider the Advantages of a Forensic Audit. Most
companies would benefit if their audit committees
sought to have the company undergo a forensic audit
on a triennial time frame.
16. Educate, Sensitize, Evaluate. The ability to function
effectively is not an inherent skill, it is a learned
talent. Companies need to make sure that directors,
officers, employees and others are educated
periodically about critical issues, sensitized to
changing standards and requirements, and evaluated
on their performance.
17. Obtain Comprehensive D&O/E&O Insurance
Coverage. In addition to broad rights of
indemnification under corporate charters,
comprehensive insurance coverage is essential
because directors may incur personal liability, the
company may be insolvent, or state or federal law
may limit indemnification or advancement of
expenses. Outside directors should be satisfied that
the disqualification of one or more directors will not
disqualify the remaining directors. Outside directors
also should look into excess "Side A" coverage, which
protects innocent outside directors when the
company's standard policies are rescinded or do not
fully protect the outside directors.
2005]
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18. Keep Apprised of Changing Policies Regarding
Personal Liability. The only certain thing about the
current landscape regarding personal liability is its
uncertainty! We are witnessing evolving standards,
sometimes affected not just by substance but by
policy and even political concerns. A well-informed
director is a smart director; making certain that you
know the changing landscape of liability is the surest
way to find critical paths to avoiding that liability.
19. Require Periodic Board Effectiveness Assessments.
Unfortunately, it isn't enough to be dedicated and
proactive. Directors need the comfort of knowing
that they are performing the way shareholders
reasonably have a right to expect them to perform.
This is best done through periodic evaluations by
independent outside experts, who can improve the
board's performance based on its actual approach to
issues.
While recent events understandably give rise to concerns
about the new potential for increased personal liability, directors
who approach their responsibilities with care and common sense,
and who are constructively proactive, should find themselves in
a positive situation vis-A-vis personal liability.
[Vol. 79:1
